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INTRODUCTION

The unincorporated association existed long before the United States itself. Not
surprisingly, South Carolina common law contains a fairly significant partnership
law tradition.' Unlike Delaware's rich corporate common law tradition, however,
South Carolina's common law contains fewjudicial opinions that address corporate
and commercial law issues. Recently, the South Carolina Court of Appeals dealt

* Jean H. Toal is the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court.

** W. Bratton Riley, who currently works for Maybank Industries, LLC, was Chief Justice Toal's
Senior Law Clerk. Together, they explore how fiduciary duties function within the partnership and
LLC context. The authors are very grateful for the contributions that Rebecca Hunter and Tina
Cundari made to this work.
1. For a brief history of partnership law, see John C. Ale, Substantive Law and Special Problems
of Generaland Limited Partnerships,in PARTNERSHIPS: UPA, ULPA, SECURITIES, TAXATION, AND
BANKRUPTCY 1 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Resource Materials, 9th ed., 1990).
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with a case about how fiduciary duties function in a general partnership and whether
any of the parties involved breached those duties.2 Although the South Carolina
Supreme Court accepted a petition for a writ of certiorari and heard the parties'
arguments, the parties settled the case before the court could issue an opinion
While preparing for Kuznik, the court's research on fiduciary duties revealed
a firestorm-a debate in legal academia that approximates the animosity of the
Yankees-Red Sox rivalry.' On one side of the debate are the contractarians-those
who believe that the libertarian principle of freedom of contract is sacrosanct
because it guarantees efficiencies, thus imposing the minimal amount of societal
costs. On the other side are the fiduciarians-those who believe that an agreement
to associate as a business, whether inadvertent, implied, or intentional, contains gapfillers, including moral obligations that parties cannot waive.6
Within this debate exists the concern recognized by the contractarians that
moralistic dictates, such as Chief Justice Cardozo's triumphant declaration of a
partner's fiduciary duty in Meinhardv. Salmon,7 do little to delineate clearly the
duties.' Immoral behavior in the business context, a contractarian would argue,
compels courts to create common-law dictates that recognize illicit conduct but do
not fit the conduct within a clearly defined fiduciary duty scheme.9 The fiduciarian

2. Kuznik v. Bees Ferry Assocs., 342 S.C. 579, 538 S.E.2d 15 (Ct. App. 2000), cert. granted
(July 3, 2001), cert. dismissed (January 23, 2004) (orders on file at South Carolina Supreme Court).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1781-82 (2001) ("The war between the
contractarians and the anticontractarians has raged for two decades and produced voluminous
literature.").
5. We borrow this term from J. William Callison, Blind Men and Elephants:FiduciaryDuties
Under the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and Beyond,
1 J. SMALL& EMERGING BUS. L. 109, 117 n.53 (1997).
6. Id.
7. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928) provides the following famous statement
of the duty of loyalty:
[Copartners] owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the
finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee
is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating
erosion' of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not
consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.
Id. at 546 (citation omitted).
8. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death ofFiduciaryDuty in Close Corporations,138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1675, 1680 (1990) ("Judges continue to infuse fiduciary analysis in close corporation law
with... ringing rhetoric .... But it is increasingly rare that courts apply the principles underlying that
rhetoric.").
9. See id. at 1680-81.
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would argue that the fiduciary duties themselves face extinction, with courts
imposing them only upon the agreement of the parties."°
Part II of this Article explores the context of the partner's fiduciary duties.1'
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA),"2 which is not the law in South
Carolina, is an important resource for understanding the fiduciary duties that
partners owe one another. RUPA does little to temper the academic squabble over
the impact of common-law fiduciary duties.13 While RUPA is an imperfect attempt
to articulate the partnership default rules, including rules creating fiduciary duties,
it does provide an important contrast to the current common law of partnerships in
South Carolina. In addition, RUPA provided the foundation for one of the more
significant commercial statutory creatures in recent times-the Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act (ULLCA).' 4
Because the Limited Liability Company (LLC) has become an incredibly
popular corporate form, and jurisprudence does not adequately illustrate the
operation of fiduciary duties in the LLC context,' 5 Part III of this Article encourages
practicing attorneys and laypersons considering creating the easy-to-form, "check

10. Cf id.
at 1681 ("[fin the course of abandoning fiduciary principles for analyses requiring less subtle
evaluations, courts implicitly have rejected... the vision of corporate ethics ....The consequence is a
significant dilution of fiduciary duty as an aspirational precept ...").
11. The following passage by Lawrence E. Mitchell articulately encapsulates the significance of
fiduciary duties:
No law or contract is likely to substitute for the trust and mutual regard of
the parties. But law can be used in a way that will help to foster the development
of trust and make it more rational. Trust is a device that, among other things,
reduces uncertainty in an enormously complex world. Much is uncertain at the
time parties enter into a partnership relationship. Although each makes
assumptions or predictions, foresight is hardly perfect. Moreover, although
presumably the parties trust each other to keep their basic agreement or they
would likely not enter into business together in the first place, they have no way
of assuring their partner's fidelity over time. Finally, each may well have
different interpretations of their mutual agreement when problems arise.
Fiduciary duty provides a means of ameliorating these difficulties by making
trust rational. In the first place, fiduciary duty gives each party a reason to trust
the other in a long-term relationship of unforeseeable consequences because,
backed by legal sanctions, it requires each party to act as if it were trustworthy,
even if circumstances incline the party to behave badly. Moreover, by instructing
the partners as to the type of behavior that is required of them, it has the potential
to forestall legal disputes by giving the parties an incentive to negotiate.
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Naked Emperor. A Corporate Lawyer Looks at RUPA 's Fiduciary
Provisions,54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 465, 480-81 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
12. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A 1 (1997).
13. See, e.g., Callison, supra note 5, at 117 ("Few have been content with RUPA's statement of
fiduciary duties.").
14. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 101, 6A U.L.A. 553, 564 cmt. (1996).
15. See, e.g., Everett A. Kendall, III, The South CarolinaLimitedLiabilityCompanyAct of1994,
47 S.C.L.REv. 181, 184 (1995) ("Unlike the partnership and the corporation, there is no common-law
ancestor of the LLC. This lack of a common-law heritage further amplifies the identity problem of the
LLC.").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

3

South Carolina
Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4 [Vol. 56: 275
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

the box" LLC' 6 to contemplate the fiduciary rules that apply to the LLC at the
outset, as opposed to waiting for guidance from future judicial opinions."
Thus, the essence of this Article, in which we attempt to define the default
fiduciary duties that apply in partnerships and our view of the fiduciary framework
of the LLC, calls for an addition of necessary depth to the fiduciary road map of
both entities. Ultimately, this Article strives to aid those selecting between the
partnership and the LLC business forms.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTY WITHIN A PARTNERSHIP

Being a creature of the common law, the partnership and its concomitant rules
and duties are the subjects of years ofjudicial opinions. In 1950, the South Carolina
General Assembly adopted the South Carolina version of the Uniform Partnership
Act (UPA), which included some of these judicially created rules and duties.'" For
a partner's fiduciary duties, the UPA merely states that every partner is accountable
to the partnership as a fiduciary. 9 This statutory language is "merely an anti-theft
provision,""0 and only the pieces of the common law are left to address the fiduciary
duties a partner owes copartners in a general partnership.
Some legal scholars bristle at the UPA's failure to define fiduciary duties. This
failure tends to perpetuate "galloping Meinhardism,"2 ' a theory under which courts
enforce fiduciary duties with flamboyant prose.22 The grandiose, moralistic
common-law declarations, both from this jurisdiction and others, present difficulty
for drafters of partnership agreements to anticipate how the common law will define
fiduciary duties in a given partnership. However, the ideas that righteous rules do
not attach to the partnership scenario and that parties can contract away these duties
in the partnership agreement are not appealing. This Section will provide some
insight into the fiduciary rules in South Carolina and the manner in which they
operate within the general partnership context.
In general, "[f]iduciary duties reflect the unspoken expectations of persons
entering into a relationship of trust and thus exist in every such relationship when

16. See discussion infra Part 1ll.
17. See Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in BalancingContractualFreedom with the
Need for Mandatory Constraintson Opportunisticand Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L.

REV. 1609 (2004) (providing an interesting argument for the need of common-law jurisprudence that
applies a more traditional approach to fiduciary duties-an approach that attaches the fiduciary duties
of care and loyalty-to the LLC).
18. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 33-41-10 to -1220 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & West Supp. 2003).
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-540 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
20. UPA Revision Subcomm. of the Comm. on P'ships and Unincorporated Bus. Orgs., Should
the Uniform PartnershipAct Be Revised?, 43 Bus. LAW 121, 151 (1987).
21. Barbara Ann Banoff, Company GovernanceUnderFlorida'sLimitedLiability CompanyAct,
30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 53, 59 (2002) (referring to Chief Justice Cardozo's opinion in Meinhard v.
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928)).
22. See, e.g., Mitchell, supranote 8, at 1696 (arguing that Chief Justice Cardozo's language in
Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546, "is aspirational and studiously imprecise. The very ambiguity of the
language conveys its moral content.., by making it difficult for a fiduciary to determine the point at
which self-serving conduct will be prohibited, and thus to encourage conduct well within the borders.")

(footnote omitted).
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nothing specific is said about such duties." 3 This Article attempts to explain how
fiduciary duties operate because the UPA fails to do so. This Article asserts that the
fiduciary duties of care, good faith and fair dealing, and loyalty attach to every
partner in a general partnership and to every general partner in a limited liability
partnership. 4 In certain circumstances, partners may agree to circumscribe the
fiduciary duty of care. For example, partners may limit liability only to those
actions involving gross negligence. Partners may not, however, contractually alter
the duty of good faith and fair dealing or the duty of loyalty.
A.

FiduciaryDuty of Care

Arguably, the most fundamental difference between the partnership and every
other business association is that if a partner becomes liable for an act within the
ordinary course of partnership business, the partnership itself becomes liable. 25 The
manner in which the default rule creating a duty of care functions to impose
mutually shared liability under this agreement will have a tremendous impact on the
partnership as a whole. Should the courts hold partners to the high standard of
ordinary care or should they only hold partners liable for those actions which rise
27
to the level of gross negligence? Historically, courts,"' and some legal scholars,
have found that the ordinary care standard should apply. Many other scholars,2" and
RUPA itself,29 determine that the standard should be set at gross negligence. Others
assert that a "one-size-fits-all" gap-filler fiduciary duty of care standard cannot
reasonably satisfy a partnership's legitimate expectations.30
The disagreement over the scope of the default duty of care signifies that
partners have different roles within the partnership. For example, surgeons may
decide to form a practice group and to select the general partnership as their form

23. J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract,FiduciaryDuties, and Partnerships:The Bargain
Principle and the Law ofAgency, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 439, 443 (1997).
24. In South Carolina's codification of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA), the powers

and liabilities of a general partner of a limited liability partnership (LLP) are the same as those of a
partner in a general partnership. S.C. CODE ANN. § 3342-630 (Law. Co-op. 1990). Generally, the
Article's references to the partnership refer to the general partnership.
25. Id. § 3341-350.
26. See Michael L. Keeley, Whose PartnershipIs It Anyway?: Revising the Revised Uniform
PartnershipAct's Duty-of-Care Term, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 612 (1994).
27. See, e.g., Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate CorporateConcepts:
FiduciaryDuties and the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 111 (1993) (arguing
that partnership law should not yet adopt the theories of contractarian corporate law, which seek to
reduce standard fiduciary duties to mere default provisions).
28. Gerard C. Martin, Duties of Care Under the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, 65 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1307 (1998).
29. Donald J. Weidner, the official reporter for RUPA, noted that the drafters of RUPA felt
disappointed with the continued use of the word "fiduciary." ... The very word
is troublesome, the sentiment seemed to be, because it is subject to abuse in the
hands ofjudges, academics and others whose flow of satisfactions is derived in
far too large a part from imposing their personal values on the more productive
members of society.
Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct Midstream: MajorPolicyDecisions,21 U.
TOL. L. REv. 825, 849 (1990).
30. Keeley, supra note 26, at 617-21.
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of business association. On a daily basis and during the ordinary course of
business, surgeons focus on patients. While all of the partners in this general
partnership would have authority to manage the partnership's business affairs, from
hiring a nurse to diversifying partnership assets through various investment
decisions, the partnership agreement might designate one or more partners as the
managing partner or partners assigned to make these types of business decisions.
This example, though simple, highlights the two different roles that a partner
in a general partnership may assume: the agent conducting the ordinary course of
business and the manager making organizational decisions for the collective entity.
Based on these two different roles, the duty should be bifurcated and attach
separately to the two respective roles that partners play in a general
partnership--the role of an agent and the role of a manager."a
As agents, partners owe the partnership the duty of care that an agent owes a
principal. a2 The Restatement (Second) of Agency states that "[u]nless otherwise
agreed, a paid agent is subject to a duty to the principal to act with standard care and
with the skill which is standard in the locality for the kind of work which he is
employed to perform."33 Thus, the law holds partners acting as agents in a general
partnership to the duty of care that persons in like circumstances are expected to
exercise-ordinary care.34
As a manager of the general partnership, each partner makes business decisions
about the direction of the partnership, and the default fiduciary duty that attaches
to those business decisions should also be that of ordinary care. Thus, partners
acting as managers in a general partnership should be held to the duty of care that
managers in like circumstances would be expected to exercise.35
The next questions are whether the business judgment rule applies to partners
acting as managers as the South Carolina Court of Appeals has ruled,36 whether the
partnership agreement may amend the ordinary care standard to that of gross
negligence for partners acting as managers, or whether perhaps both apply.37 In the

31. Gerard C. Martin poignantly presented this bifurcation in his article, Duties of Care Under
the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1307 (1998), which influenced the
forthcoming discussion.
32. The Uniform Partnership Act states that"[e]very partner is an agent of the partnership." S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-41-310(1) (Law. Co-op. 1990). "[T]he rights and liabilities of partners with respect
to each other and to third persons are largely determined by agency principles." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A cmt. a (1958).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379(1) (1958).
34. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1988) (delineating fiduciary

obligations reflecting "the duties of care and loyalty owed under Maine law by a corporate director to
the corporation and it shareholders, as well as the duties of a partner to the partnership and his fellow
partners").

35. Not surprisingly, not everyone agrees that the partners must measure up to the ordinary care
standard to which agents must adhere. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, 2 BROMBERG &
RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 6.07(0 at 6:141 (1997).
36. Kuznik v. Bees Ferry Assocs., 342 S.C. 579,600-05, 538 S.E.2d 15, 26-28 (Ct. App. 2000).
37. As the Delaware Supreme Court proclaimed in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985), the business judgment rule grants the presumption that the corporate director or officer
makes good faith, well-informed business decisions. The businessjudgment rule operates as a defense
to a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty of care, precluding "judicial review of actions taken by a
corporate governing board absent a showing of a lack of good faith, fraud, self-dealing or
unconscionable conduct." Dockside Ass'n, Inc. v. Detyens, 294 S.C. 86, 87, 362 S.E.2d 874, 874
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partnership context, the business judgment rule should not apply. Instead, the
partners may agree to amend the duty of care standard to that of gross negligence."a
From a purely practical standpoint, partnerships likely would prefer to establish the
gross negligence standard on the front-end rather than to wait for the judicial
application of the business judgment rule on the back-end.
While not perfect, the viewpoint reflected in this Article is that this application
of the fiduciary duty of care standard to the partnership gives some contractual
flexibility, while maintaining the normally high fiduciary standards associated with
the partnership. Those partners who want to form a partnership because of the
benefits associated with the high fiduciary standards39 may maintain the default rule
for manager-partners at the ordinary care level. For those who believe that partners
should be able to establish a lower standard of care, they may do so for partners'
managerial decisions. For those averse to the "one-size-fits-all approach," this
method provides the partnership some flexibility to mold the fiduciary duty of care
standard to fit the agent-manager bifurcation.
B. Fillingthe Gaps with MoralBehavior: Cloakingthe Partnershipwith the
Moral Obligationsof Good Faith and FairDealingand Loyalty
While the formula for determining how the fiduciary duty of care operates in
the partnership is relatively comprehensible thanks to the rich common-law standard
of ordinary care, the other two fiduciary duties remain less clearly defined. Courts
have had more difficulty articulating the standard for bad behavior and how parties
might breach the standard of moral business behavior.
How does society inject into the law what an individual's moral compass
measures as good behavior versus bad behavior? "You just know it," some might
say; or at least one knows what the measurement is not. Society should not permit
business activity conducted without honor, trustworthiness, loyalty, and good
intentions. But defining mandatory moral duties that encompass these concepts in

(1987).
The General Assembly's adoption of the Model Business Corporation Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 331-101 to -20-105 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & West Supp. 2003), applies a provision akin to the business

judgment rule to corporations in South Carolina. Section 33-8-300 states:
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee:

(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders.
Id. The official comment specifically states that the provision "does not try to codify the business
judgment rule," giving deference to the courts to continue to mold their interpretations of the commonlaw rule. Id. § 33-8-300 cmt. (Law. Co-op. 1990).
38. Comment a to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 states that "[a]n agreement

with the principal that the agent is not to be liable to him for negligence not of a gross character is
legal." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958).
39. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 27, at 147 (noting that while most traditional cases applying
a heightened fiduciary obligation involved the duty of loyalty, some duty of care cases "reflect a high
moral tone").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56: 275

the law, and applying them to the general partnership, understandably frustrates
contractarians because it leaves for judicial interpretation, rather than contractual
agreement, the imprecise evaluation of whether or not an individual's conduct is
wrong.
The common law echoes with paradigm cases that recognize a partner's breach
of a fiduciary duty.40 On the other hand, case law that delineates each of the
fiduciary obligations that attaches to partners in a general partnership is notably
absent from the common law. Critics assert that this common-law development
41
breeds a lack of uniformity that the drafters of RUPA attempted to correct.
Notwithstanding this lack of uniformity, mandatory moral obligations must attach
to the partnerships and this Article aims to deepen the two "moral" duties: (1) the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and (2) the duty of loyalty.
Initially, this Part clearly defines the differences between the duty of good faith
and fair dealing and the duty of loyalty. However, as the drafters of RUPA and
ULLCA failed to provide a complete understanding of the terms, this Article does
not. Rather, the Article demonstrates that both duties are alive and well in South
Carolina by gleaning from South Carolina common-law tradition and other bodies
of common law.
1. FiduciaryDuty of Good Faith and FairDealing
The South Carolina Supreme Court has long recognized the partner's fiduciary
duty of good faith and fair dealing. 42 The Court described the nature of a partner's
fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing in the following way:
The law holds each member of a partnership to the highest
degree of goodfaith in his dealings with reference to any matter
which concerns the business of the common engagement, and
each partner, being the agent of the firm, must be held to the same
40. See, for example, Chief Justice Cardozo's oft-cited prose in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E.

545 (N.Y. 1928).
41. Unlike the UPA, which does not specify the particular fiduciary duties that a partner owes
copartners, Banoff, supra note 21, at 59, so that the courts have instead determined what these duties
are, RUPA establishes that a partner must only exercise a fiduciary duty of care and a fiduciary duty
of loyalty. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(a), 6 U.L.A. 143 (1997). RUPA defines the extent of these two

duties under subsections 404(b) and (c). Id. § 404(b)-(c). Quite confusingly, RUPA states that a
partner owes a mandatory duty of good faith and fair dealing under section 103(b)(5) but does not
classify it as a fiduciary duty. Id. § 103(b)(5). A partner, however, must exercise the duties of care,
good faith and fair dealing, and loyalty. Incidentally, just over half of the states, South Carolina
excluded, have adopted RUPA. Paul Powell, Comment, Dissociatingthe Fiduciary:Duty Revisions
and the Resulting Confusion in Idaho's New PartnershipLaw, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 145, 148 (1999).
Unlike the states that have adopted the UPA, the states that have adopted RUPA have not uniformly

adopted all portions of the Act. Allan W. Vestal, "Assume a Rather Large Boat... ":The Mess We
Have Made of PartnershipLaw, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 487, 519-20 (1997). Consequently, it
appears, RUPA has failed to provide uniformity to partnership law.
42. See Few v. Few, 239 S.C. 321, 336, 122 S.E.2d 829, 836 (1961) ("[P]artners are treated as

fiduciaries each to the other and [the court] characterizes their relationship as one of mutual trust and
confidence, imposing upon them the usual trust requirements of loyalty, good faith and fair dealing.")
(citing Whitman v. Bowden, 27 S.C. 53, 61,2 S.E. 630, 633 (1884); Price v. Middleton, 75 S.C. 105,
112, 55 S.E. 156, 159 (1906); Badder v. Saleeby, 131 S.C. 101, 107, 126 S.E. 438, 440 (1924)).
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accountability as other trustees, in all matters which affect the
common interest. The relationship of a partnership is fiduciary in
character and imposes on the members the obligation of refraining
from taking any advantage of one another by the slightest
misrepresentationor concealment.4"
This passage appears to describe appropriately the nature of this duty, which
generally mandates that each partner act in good faith and, more specifically,
suggests that a partner must conduct his actions contritely and without bad
intentions that adversely affect the copartners.
Unlike the fiduciary duty of care standard, the fiduciary duty of good faith and
fair dealing is not a default rule; it is mandatory. Thus, partners may not limit the
fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing by contract. "[A] good faith standard
stands as a floor below which fiduciaries may never fall.""
Some may be highly dissatisfied with this view of the partner's fiduciary duty
of good faith and fair dealing. To them, this view is a grandiose, arbitrary good-faith
standard from the common law that leaves considerable room for interpretation,
approximates the fiduciary duty of good faith to that of the honesty-in-fact
standard,45 and imposes a rule that parties cannot waive. Contrasting South Carolina
law with the law of the thirty-five states that have adopted RUPA46 and critiquing
RUPA's treatment of good faith and fair dealing helps provide depth to this
standard.47
Curiously, RUPA provides that the only fiduciary duties that attach to partners
in a general partnership are the duties of care and loyalty. 4 While not designating
good faith and fair dealing as a "duty," RUPA provides that partners must "exercise
any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing."49 In the
comments to RUPA, the drafters noted the following:

43. Lawson v. Rogers, 312 S.C. 492, 498, 435 S.E.2d 853, 857 (1993) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
44. John Geschke, Note, RegulatingRollups: GeneralPartners'FiduciaryObligationsin Light
of the Limited PartnershipRollup Reform Act of 1993, 47 STAN. L. REV. 85, 105 (1994).
45. The fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing does not appear to be limited to the honestyin-fact standard.
46. UNIF. P'sHIP AcT, General Statutory Note (amended 2004), 6 U.L.A. 8-57 (1997).
According to the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, thirty-five states,
including the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands, have adopted the blueprint of RUPA.
Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the Uniform PartnershipAct (1994) (1997), at
http://www.nccusI.org/nccusl/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa9497.asp (last visited Nov. 15,
2004).
47. This analysis only helps define what the duty is not. Professor Robert Summers wrote that
the contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing is "an 'excluder' ... a phrase without general
meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad
faith." Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General ContractLaw and the Sales Provisionsof the
Uniform CommercialCode, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 201 (1968) (citing Hall, Excluders, 20 ANALYSIS 1
(1959)).
48. UNIF. P'SHIp ACT § 404(a), 6 U.L.A. 143 (1997). Part II.B.2 will examine the difference
between South Carolina law and RUPA's treatment of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
49. Id. § 404(d), 6 U.L.A. 143 (1997).
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The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is a contract
concept, imposed on the partners because of the consensual nature
of a partnership. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205
(1981). It is not characterized, in RUPA, as a fiduciary duty
arising out of the partners' special relationship. Nor is it a
separate and independent obligation. It is an ancillary obligation
that applies whenever a partner discharges a duty or exercises a
right under the partnership agreement or the Act.5°
Clearly, in South Carolina, the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing is not
based on its counterpart in contract; rather, the duty, long embraced in the commonlaw tradition, attaches to partners precisely because of their special relationship as
co-owners of an entity that shares profits and losses.
The significance of this difference between the contractual covenant of good
faith and fair dealing and the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing may incite
more controversy in academia than it does in reality. Again, the debate arises
between contractarians, who would assert that any mandatory duty or obligation of
good faith and fair dealing is unnecessary, and fiduciarians, who hold fiduciary
duties in the highest moral regard and would leave it to the courts to analyze and
fashion remedies for breaches of these moral duties."' It seems the drafters of
RUPA made an attempt to mediate between these two factions by treating the
"obligation" as one that arises in contract, thereby limiting the remedy for breach
to contractual damages, as opposed to a more broad-brush fiduciary remedy. 2
Conversely, in South Carolina, the non-waivable duty of good faith and fair dealing
attaches to every partner in a partnership, and the remedies that arise from a breach
of the duty are not confined to contractual damages.5 3
2. FiduciaryDuty ofLoyalty
South Carolina has a common-law tradition of recognizing that partners owe
each other a duty of loyalty as well as a fiduciary duty of good faith and fair
dealing. 4 Like the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the duty of loyalty is easy to
define by analogy but difficult to define by articulating a hard and fast rule. "The
shape of the duty of loyalty only becomes clear by reference to actions that raise a

50. Id. § 404 cmt. 4, 6 U.L.A. 145 (1997).

51. See Callison, supra note 5, at 119-21.
52. This issue introduces a discussion of how the obligation applies in the LLC context, which
Part 111 discusses.
53. In the future, supplanting the common-law tradition of recognizing the duty of good faith and
fair dealing in partnership law in favor of recognizing a related concept based on contract law is
unnecessary, principally because the partnership itself is a creature of common law, long recognized

as an unincorporated entity prior to the UPA's creation in 1914 and adoption in South Carolina in 1950.
Further, the very existence of a partnership has been an oft-litigated issue, and in South Carolina, a
partnership may exist without the partners' express intention to form one. Wyman v. Davis, 223 S.C.
172, 174, 74 S.E.2d 694, 695 (1953). Precisely because potential partners do not always prenegotiate
partnership agreements, these fiduciary duty "gap-fillers" are necessary to enforce moral obligations,

including the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
54. See Few v. Few, 239 S.C. 321, 336, 122 S.E.2d 829, 836 (1961).
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suspicion of disloyalty."" Rather than taking a "you know it when you see it"
approach, this Article attempts to give some definitional depth to the duty.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, comparing partners to
stockholders in a close corporation, held that stockholders "may not act out of
avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other
stockholders and to the corporation."56 This definition is as good as any other
because it incorporates the notion that a partner may not appropriate to himself
something that the partnership should appropriate to copartners or to the
partnership. Just as with the duty of7 good faith and fair dealing, partners cannot
waive the fiduciary duty of loyalty.1
Like its treatment of good faith and fair dealing, RUPA places constraints on
the fiduciary duty of loyalty by limiting it to the following three circumstances:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any
property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the
conduct and winding up of the partnership business or
derived from a use by the partner of partnership property,
including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or
winding up of the partnership business as or on behalf of a
party having an interest adverse to the partnership; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct
of the partnership business before the dissolution of the
partnership.5"
The fiduciary duty of loyalty should not be limited to those three categories but
should include a broader range of conduct in which the self-interest of a partner has
a negative impact on another partner or on the partnership as a whole.59
3. Postscript
To many, this discussion of how a partner must adhere to rigorous fiduciary
standards fills too many gaps in the partnership agreement, whether implied or
written in detail. This Article reflects the view, however, that what makes a
55. Geschke, supra note 44, at 102.
56. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975).

57. Contractarians and law-economists attack this principle that prvents parties from waiving
their rights. See, e.g., Hynes, supra note 23, at 443 (arguing that fiduciary duties can be bargained
away subject to the "customary limits on contract bargaining"); LarryE. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform
PartnershipAct: Not Readyfor Prime Time, 49 BUS. LAW. 45,58 (1993) ("Mandatory fiduciary duties
also are bad policy because they preclude worthwhile contracts."). This Article reflects the view,
however, that society's interest in corporate ethics, especially inlight of the recent rash of corporate
fraud, should trump an individual's freedom to enter into a partnership contract free ofthese fiduciary
obligations. Further, establishing these fiduciary duties promotes efficiency because potential partners
and their lawyers will no longer need to conjecture or approximate exactly what these obligations entail.
58. UNIF. P'SHIP AcT § 404(b), 6 U.L.A. 143 (1997).

59. An example of the broader context in which the fiduciary duty of loyalty should apply is
when, inthe partnership formation stage, a future partner deals with a future competitor in a manner
that inhibits the future partnership's ability to compete.
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partnership a partnership is the faith partners can have in the historically recognized
gap-fillers that require partners to adhere to high standards. Because courts may
find that a partnership exists even when the parties did not expressly intend to create
one, potential and present partners should understand that high, mandatory, and
sometimes moral standards may attach under the common law.
Therefore, one thinking of starting a business, or an attorney evaluating the
various business entity options for a client, who is intimidated by these high
fiduciary standards, should not form a partnership. Many other options are
available, including perhaps most prominently the United States, which the Article
discusses in the next part.
III. THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
The advent and popularity of the LLC represents one of the more fascinating
recent developments in corporate law. The advantages and flexibility of the LLC
are many, including: (1) ease of formation, 6' (2) flexibility as to taxation,62 (3)
limited liability, 63 and (4) continuity despite a member's death. 64 In the articles of
organization, the membership may elect to have the company manager-managed,
with the manager running the company in its ordinary course of business similar to
a general partner, or as a corporate officer or director.6" Absent election in the
articles of organization to be manager-managed, the LLC will be member-managed
by default where, similar to the general partnership and subject to modification by
the operating agreement, the members have equal managerial rights, duties, and
obligations.66
South Carolina's Limited Liability Company Act (LLC Act),67 enacted in 1996,
is the state's version of the ULLCA, which was largely based on RUPA.6 s Like
RUPA, the LLC Act establishes that only two fiduciary duties apply in the LLC
context-those of care and loyalty. 69 Based on the fiduciary roadmap set forth in the

60. See Wyman v. Davis, 223 S.C. 172, 174, 74 S.E.2d 694, 695 (1953).
61. Formation of an LLC is extremely easy in South Carolina. A person founding an LLC need
only select a corporate name, pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-105 (West Supp. 2003) and fill out
the articles of organization, pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-44-202 to -44-203 (West Supp. 2003).
62. An LLC may select pass-through taxation, like a partnership, or may select taxation as a
corporation. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(b)(1), .7701-3(a) (as amended in 2003).
63. Members or managers of an LLC are not personally liable for company debts and obligations
"solely by reason of being or acting as a member or manager." S.C. CODEANN. § 33-44-303(a) (West
Supp. 2003). However, like most default rules of the Limited Liability Company Act (LLC Act), the
operating agreement can modify this rule to specify that a particular member or manager will be
personally liable for LLC debts and obligations. Id. § 33-44-303(c).
64. A partner's death triggers dissolution of a partnership, but an LLC member's death does not
trigger dissolution. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-930 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (listing death of a
partner as one of the causes of dissolution of a partnership) with S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-801 (West
Supp. 2003) (listing five possible events causing dissolution of an LLC, but not including death of a
member).
65. Id. §§ 33-44-203 to -44-301 (West Supp. 2003).
66. Id. §§ 33-44-203 cmt., 44-301.
67. Id. §§ 33-44-101 to -1207.
68. Id. § 33-44-101 cmt.
69. Id. § 33-44-409(a).
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LLC Act, this Part provides the practicing attorney and the layperson some thoughts
on how these rules might operate and how courts might interpret them.
A. FiduciaryDuty of Care
South Carolina's LLC Act clearly establishes gross negligence as the default
fiduciary duty of care standard for both members of a member-managed LLC and
managers of a manager-managed LLC.70 The Act also permits the LLC
membership to alter the duty of care standard as long as the standard is not
unreasonably reduced. 7 Presumably, any reduction of this standard of care from
gross negligence would be unreasonable. However, if the members prefer a higher
duty of care standard than gross negligence-perhaps the ordinary care standard
that applies to the partnership-they may adopt another standard.
B. Good Faith and FairDealing
Like RUPA, the LLC Act does not classify the duty of good faith and fair
dealing as a fiduciary duty72 but rather characterizes it as an "obligation."73 This
provision represents a victory for the contractarians because, presumably, this
obligation is based on the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair
dealing rather than the common-law, Meinhard-influencedfiduciary duty of good
faith and fair dealing. In practice, the effect of this difference may be minimal.74
Finally, the LLC Act forbids the elimination of this obligation.75
C. Duty ofLoyalty
The duty of loyalty attaches to members and managers of an LLC, but like
RUPA, the LLC Act limits the duty's application to require the members and
managers:
(1) to account to the company and to hold as trustee for it any
property, profit, or benefit derived by the member in the
conduct or winding up of the company's business or derived
from a use by the member of the company's property,
including the appropriation of a company's opportunity;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the company in the conduct or
winding up of the company's business as or on behalf of a
party having an interest adverse to the company; and

70. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 33-44-409(c), (h)(2) (West Supp. 2003).

71. Id. § 33-44-103(b)(3).
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-409(a) (West Supp. 2003) states that "[ft]he only fiduciary duties
a member owes to a member-managed company and its other members are the duty of loyalty and the
duty of care."
73. Id. § 33-44-409(d).
74. See infra Part II.D.
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-103(b)(4) (West Supp. 2003).
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(3) to refrain from competing with the company in the conduct of
the company's
business before the dissolution of the
76
company.

Moreover, the LLC Act also provides that, by unanimous consent, the LLC
membership can ratify acts that "would otherwise violate the duty of loyalty.""
Finally, like the "obligation" of good faith and fair dealing, the parties cannot waive
the fiduciary duty of loyalty.76

D. PracticalImplications of the LLC's Reduced FiduciaryStandards
The fiduciary framework of the LLC Act is cut-and-dried and, like RUPA, is
heavily influenced by the contractarian mandate of the 1990s. Despite the reduced
fiduciary standards that the LLC Act applies-gross negligence, a contract lawbased covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a confined interpretation of the
duty of loyalty-will courts have enough tools to evaluate illicit corporate actions
that might not fit neatly into one of these three categories?79 In our view, since the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing is not defined or constrained, it will likely
become the catch-all provision that courts will apply to conduct that calls the
member's moral behavior into question.
IV. CONCLUSION

Fortunately, because the contractarian theory has not infiltrated South Carolina
law, today's South Carolina partnerships must abide by the same fiduciary rules that
have applied for many decades. While the contractarian ideology provides a
fascinating lens through which a business association can be analyzed, we believe
the viewpoint does not encapsulate how our culture functions.
Like macroeconomic theory in general, contractarian theory fails to function
properly without certain assumptions: primarily, that all parties entering into a
business association have perfect knowledge and equal bargaining power. While
these assumptions permit the theorist to explore the fascinating world of modeling
human and economic behavior, an exploration that has contributed much to our
society, in practice, these assumptions necessarily produce a sanitized viewpoint
that is not representative of society's attitudes and conduct when entering into a
business association.

76. Id. § 33-44-409(b).

77. Id. § 33-44-404(c)(2). From a practical perspective, the LLC Act does not need to limit the
application of the fiduciary duty of loyalty to three specific scenarios when the Act also contains a
safety net provision that permits the LLC to evaluate a member's action that violates the duty. The LLC

membership's determination ofwhether to let stand a member's action that would otherwise violate the
duty of loyalty seems to be a much more effective mechanism for determining whether the duty has
been implicated, as opposed to the confined application provided in the LLC Act.

78. Id. § 33-44-103(b)(2).
79. See, e.g., Callison, supra note 5, at 139 (arguing that an illicit expulsion of a lawyer from a

partnership would not fit within the three specified fiduciary duty of loyalty scenarios specified in
RUPA whose duty of loyalty provisions are very similar to the LLC Act).
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When applied to the partnership, the contractarian model seems to rely on the
assumption that the partnership itself is based in contract,8" and since all partners
had perfect knowledge and equal bargaining power, courts should limit their
evaluation of the partnership to what the parties intended at the moment of
partnership formation. This assumption fails to recognize the fact that the
partnership is human history's oldest business association of two or more people
and that a partnership can exist without the parties so intending. Partnership law is
not based on the principles of contract law; rather, it is based on a rich common law
tradition that recognizes high fiduciary standards that apply regardless of perfect
knowledge or equal bargaining power. South Carolina continues to recognize this
tradition where, to put it simply, we let the partnership be a partnership. The
partnership remains a business entity that provides the protection of fiduciary duties
and demands that partners adhere to high fiduciary standards.
In South Carolina, a clear delineation exists between the high fiduciary
standards of the partnership and the lower standards of the LLC. The partnership
should have, in our view: (1) a mandatory duty of ordinary care that attaches to the
partner's conduct in the ordinary course and (2) a default rule of ordinary care,
which can be reduced to the gross negligence standard, that attaches to the partner's
conduct as a manager of the firm. The mandatory fiduciary duties of good faith and
fair dealing and loyalty also apply to the partnership.
The statutory rules that form the fiduciary foundation ofthe LLC are as follows:
(1) a default gross negligence duty of care, (2) a mandatory obligation of good faith
and fair dealing, and (3) a mandatory duty of loyalty. All three rules provide lower
standards than their partnership counterparts: the default duty of care standard is
reduced from ordinary care to gross negligence, the good faith standard is a
contractual-based obligation and not a fiduciary duty, and the duty of loyalty is
limited to three specific circumstances. Given the relaxed fiduciary framework of
the LLC and the fact that the good faith and fair dealing standard is termed an
obligation but not limited in its application, courts will likely broaden the
implications of the obligation such that morally offensive behavior that may not
neatly breach the care or loyalty standards will be deemed "bad faith" behavior
resulting in a breach of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
80. See, e.g., J. Dennis Hynes, Fiduciary Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry into Freedom of
Contract,LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1995, at 29, 39:
The partnership relationship is most understandably viewed as a contractual
relationship in all of its respects, as developed below. This doubtless reflects the
view of those who enter partnerships, that they can agree among themselves what
they want their relationship to be. From this perspective, it is inappropriate for the
state to interfere with a bargain freely and openly made by persons seeking to
define a business relationship.
Id. See also Ribstein, supra note 57, at 52:
Fiduciary duty is a type of contractual term courts supply because the parties
themselves would have contracted for the duties if it were not so costly to contract
in detail. Fiduciary duties do not differ fundamentally from other types of terms
the courts supply in interpreting contracts. Because fiduciary duties are

contractual "gap-fillers," the precise nature of the duties that exist in any
particular contractual relationship depends on the express and implied terms of

the relevant contract.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis omitted).
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